Why people join terrorist groups

Last week NYTimes Magazine ran the story The Jihadist Next Door which chronicled the radicalization and self-recruitment of Omar Hammami, a member of the terrorist group al Shabaab in Somalia.

Hammami, who grew up in Alabama a product of a middle-class family in a two-religion household, began his radicalization while in high school. According to the story, during his sophomore year in 2000 Hammami defended Osama bin Laden after a classmate suggested bin Laden be shot dead for his involvement with the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

“What if I said that about Billy Graham?” said Hammami to his classmate, a Christian.

“Billy Graham is a peaceable preacher,” said the classmate “Osama bin Laden is a terrorist.”

In reply, Hammami said “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”

From here, the article takes the story of Hammami and reveals some insight into how individuals go from unlikely beginnings to become international terrorists.

In my opinion (*not a psychologist), Hammami had some behavioral traits that are fairly common amongst Islamic radicals who resort to terrorism. Specifically, recognition and popularity amongst Islamic peers seemed to drive Hammami’s participation in violent jihad. Reportedly, Hammami’s feelings towards the conflict in Somalia and the suppression of the Islamic armed group al Shabab hardened his resolve to fight. Paraphrasing from the article:

By 2006, Hammami had become convinced that “jihad had become an obligation.”  And further, he wanted to help his “captive brothers and sisters” while helping himself “obtain the highest rank available” as a Muslim. In August 2006 Hammami wrote “where is the desire to do something amazing? Where is the urge to get up and change yourself — not to mention the world and other issues further off?”

Eventually, Hammami would travel to Somalia and join up with al Shabaab, which brings me to my next point: along with notoriety, I feel individuals become radicalized because they embrace conflict and have a proclivity towards merciless adventurism. In essence, they are jihad adrenaline junkies. I think this trait is shared amongst other jihadists, like the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Thus along with the ascetic of traditional Islamic life, these radicals also enjoy the popularity and adventure that violent jihad can give them.

Democratizing ‘factors of production’ is the next industrial revolution

Chris Anderson has this very cool article in Wired Magazine.  It’s all about how small, independently owned businesses are pulling resources from open-source media and crowd-sourcing to build, design, and bring to market innovative products that fulfill consumer wants not met by big, slow-adapting corporations.  The article highlights a number of businesses which blogger Jason Kottke terms “small batch” because (like good bourbon) they focus on craftsmanship, producing quality over quantity.

One company, MakerBot, produces 3-D printers for sale at less than $1,000. Another, Anderson’s own DIY Drones, helps flight enthusiasts share ideas and collaborate to build their own personal unmanned aerial vehicles. But to me, the two most awesome small batch businesses profiled by Anderson were:

• Local Motors, whose mission is to “lead the next generation of automotive manufacturing, design, and technology in order to revolutionize the industry with game-changing efficient vehicles and an unprecedented standard of customer service.”

Local Motor's "Rally Fighter" designed by Sangho Kim

• BrickArms, a manufacturer of custom built hardcore LEGO weapons!

Mullah Omar in the cloak of the Prophet Mohammad?

Iconic Photos posted this photo, reportedly of Mullah Omar wrapping himself in the Prophet Mohammed’s cloak. In total there are only a couple pictures of the Taliban leader available to the public, so it is hard to decipher if this one is legitimate. But if true, this photo depicts one of the most interesting acts conducted by Omar: the ceremony in which he proclaimed himself Amir-ul Momineen (“Leader of the Faithful”) by donning a nearly 1400 year old sacred cloak.

Memo: US response to Iran’s nuclear program

It’s the end of the semester here at The Fletcher School. With that comes finals. One of my finals was a policy options memo on how the U.S. could respond to the current Iranian nuclear issue. The memo is about 1,500 words, but I just wanted to share about 600 words that cover, what I think, are the 3 courses of action available to U.S. policy-makers. Here goes:

The Obama administration has essentially three viable courses of action in which to proceed: engagement, containment & deterrence, and rollback. These three options cannot be pursued simultaneously but exist along a continuum. These options can be augmented by supplementary inducements, both political and economic.

• Engagement has been “Plan A” for this administration. Whether in a multilateral framework or bilateral talks, negotiations with Iran have been shrouded with threats of punitive economic action. To compel Iran to put its nuclear program on the negotiating table will likely require harsher sanctions on the regime. However, it will be tremendously difficult to gain international support for what essentially would be a near-boycott of Iran.
  • The downside to engaging Iran with the threat of economic sanctions is the policy’s risk of hardening disapproval against the U.S. in the region. Further, the success of this policy is inextricably linked to our ability to gain an international coalition to impose such sanctions.

• Connected to engagement is the “Plan B” option of what the U.S. could do to oppose an Iran with nuclear weapons. Here, U.S. policy would be one of containment and deterrence against the regime. This option becomes enacted whence the failure of engagement. To maximize the utility of containment and deterrence, the U.S. will need to form multinational strategic partnerships and explicitly convey these partnerships to Iran.
  • Necessarily, the U.S. would have to extend its nuclear umbrella to allies, deterring Iran based on our second-strike capabilities. As with engagement, containment will require increased international cooperation to isolate Iran.

• The rollback option will emphasize less engagement, although engagement can be a tool to gauge Iranian intentions. Rollback will begin with increasingly stringent sanctions; then it will be followed by preventative strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The rollback policy will require significant calibration to signal our resolve against Iran. Necessarily, regime change will be seen as an escalation of this policy. By gradually escalating the use of force, the U.S. could dissuade Iran sufficiently to cease its nuclear activities.
  • The risks posed by this option are great. The American image abroad will suffer should another attempt at regime change occur. Additionally, there is the risk that escalation could draw the U.S. into a larger war with Iran. Further, it will be difficult to predict the behavior of an Iran that has been directly attacked by the U.S.

• Supplementary inducements include the repeal of current sanctions against Iran. Additionally, political concessions to Iran will have to be made. The U.S. will most likely have to back Iran’s ascent to greater regional leadership.
  • As an supplement, inducements are most likely to succeed with the rollback option. However, this combination still holds the most risks to American interests. Inducements coupled with engagement could produce positive results, but the “Plan B” containment and deterrence option must remain as a safety mechanism.

Recommendation: Engagement coupled with political and economic inducements should be this administration’s priority. However, this policy should be prefaced with explicit statements that any and all available means will be employed to contain and deter Iran if engagement does not work. Although this strategy may strengthen Ahmadinejad’s hold on power, it offers the best chance of de-nuclearizing the country without having to resort to force.

Massacre in Mindanao

The “Lede” of the New York Times has a blog post about the recent massacre on Mindanao Island, Philippines. According to latest reports, the death toll has reached 57 and the President has called for a state of emergency.

The Lede alludes to the possibility that the massacre is linked to former provincial governor, and head of the powerful Ampatuan clan, Andal Ampatuan. Many consider the Ampatuan clan a government backed militia used to suppress Islamist rebels, like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Those massacred were from the rival Mangudadatu clan. They were killed while en route to file gubernatorial candidacy papers for the clan’s leader Esmael Mangudadatu. Amongst the dead were Mr. Mangudadatu’s wife and daughter.  Mr. Mangudadatu is a Vice Mayor of a district in Maguindanao province. He was unharmed in the attack.

Filipino broadcaster Marites Vitug, called the clan violence a “monster” created by the government. Vitug further stated “[President] Arroyo not only faces a political problem here but the possibility that there may be massive retaliation or rido. When it comes to rido, women, children and old people are never touched. But Monday’s atrocity has changed all that.”

Clan retaliation (or “rido”) has prompted worries form President Arroyo and the central government. According to a USAID research project, there were 218 cases of rido in Maguindanao province (where the massacre occurred) from the 1930s to 2005.

Corruption ain’t cheap

Cartoon by Tom Toles

Afghanistan is corrupt, waaaaayyyy corrupt

Not that we didn’t know this already but Afghanistan’s government is incredibly corrupt.  So corrupt that there is only one country in the world more corrupt: Somalia.  And some might not even call that a country.

How much does corruption hurt American efforts in Afghanistan?  Well, considering incorruptibility is a main reason behind the Taliban’s popularity, I would say it hurts a great deal.

For the quick rundown, here is Transparency International’s 5 most corrupt regimes in the world (2009).

1. Somalia
2. Afghanistan
3. Myanmar
4. Sudan
5. Iraq

No doubt American profligate spending in these countries has fueled corruption.  It is about time that the U.S. rethink its gun in one hand, dollar in the other, approach to intervention.

Obama’s message of internet freedom in China, censored by China

Speaking in front of a town hall meeting in Shanghai yesterday, President Obama called for more internet freedom in China and took on the issue of the country’s “great firewall” blocking internet traffic.  While many event attendees seemed to be members of the China Communist Youth League, one lone Twitterer was able to slip in a question about China’s ongoing internet censorship.  In response to the question, President Obama said:

I’ve always been a strong supporter of open Internet use. I’m a big supporter of non-censorship. This is part of the tradition of the United States that I discussed before, and I recognize that different countries have different traditions. I can tell you that in the United States, the fact that we have free Internet — or unrestricted Internet access is a source of strength, and I think should be encouraged.

Reports were that this Q & A was not aired by China’s state owned new agency, Xinhua.  Additionally, Obama’s statements on internet freedom and open communications were being glossed over by more trivial inquiries into his Facebook account.

In my opinion, President Obama should maintain his calls for open communication to “draw the world together,” as he said.  Maybe even 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Obama can echo ex-President Reagan and say: Mr. Jintao, tear down this firewall!

To make a molehill out of a mountain

Cartoon by Tom Toles

A Strategy To Die For?

75 U.S. military personnel died in Afghanistan last month during Operation Enduring Freedom.  More than 900 have lost their lives since that war began over 8 years ago.  Of the dead, almost 350 occurred in the last 6 months.  A potential decision by President Obama to increase troop levels will result in yet more unnecessary American, NATO, and Afghan civilian deaths.

Increasing America’s troop presence in Afghanistan will be the most irresponsible decision Obama has made as president. It is time to re-focus our mission there and re-direct attention to where it belongs, the homeland.  Already top military leaders – to include General Petraeus and General McChrystal – have said that al Qaeda cannot stage attacks against the U.S. from Afghanistan.  Maintaining this level of security only requires an operational capacity to do counter-terrorism in Afghanistan.  Supplying a counter-terrorism mission will require far fewer resources in terms of both troops and dollars spent.

For relatively cheap, the U.S. can conduct drone attacks, special operations, and train Afghanistan’s own security forces.  Each of these has been done since the war’s beginning.  In 2002 and 2003, these missions were done with less than 20,000 troops in theater – at a cost of less than $20 billion a year.  Roughly Operation Enduring Freedom costs American taxpayers $1 billion a year to sustain each 1,000^th American military service member in Afghanistan.  Obama’s plan to add an additional troops will likely push the costs of Operation Enduring Freedom over $100 billion a year.

How long can the U.S. spend so much?  Most estimates are that “victory” is still years ahead.  Yet, it has already been 8 years of “nation-building” and, at best, we can say the Karzai-led government is a weak and corrupt ally.  To paraphrase the old proverb: with allies like these, who needs enemies? Obama must re-think his definitions of success, unless the U.S. is to get bogged down in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.

Al Qaeda has not re-established Afghanistan as a stronghold since October 2001. That was some sort of victory; maybe it’s the only sort of “victory” needed. Operation Enduring Freedom needs to be concentrated, not expanded.

Instead of trying to build a government in Afghanistan, Obama should focus on what’s a priority to every American. Namely, America.

The Department of Homeland Security’s 2010 budget tops in at just around $50 billion. That’s half of what we’re likely to spend in Afghanistan.  Tax revenues for Afghanistan’s own government barely surpass $700 million a year; still Washington chooses to devote American debt to a cause that has no clear end-point. With a record budget deficit of nearly $1.6 trillion, Afghanistan does not deserve the resources.

The argument that a troop increase in Afghanistan will help us meet some sort of strategic victory is tenuous when placed against what we are defending ourselves from.  A large troop presence in Afghanistan destabilizes Pakistan by pushing militants into the tribal areas and providing ample propaganda for Muslim separatists.  Aside from the Taliban and al Qaeda, a destabilized Pakistan is the last thing anyone in the world wants.

Meanwhile, trying to garrison Afghanistan when we cannot do the same to Pakistan, the Horn of Africa, or Yemen will be fruitless against a terrorist enemy not bound by territory. An honest assessment would show that protecting the homeland should start at home, and not 8,000 miles away. Knowing this, it is time to re-direct many of our finite resources back to the U.S.

The Obama administration should strengthen efforts to protect against cyber-warfare and espionage. Resources should be devoted to border enforcement and towards forming a better immigration process that increases the U.S. government’s ability to keep track of who exactly is inside the country. The Coast Guard should be enlarged.  And lastly, all efforts to increase security at airports, seaports, and other points of entry must be taken.  If we cannot afford any of these measures, then partial blame must go to an obtuse Afghan war strategy with no end in sight.