Gringo Lost

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Posts Tagged ‘North Korea

The most worrisome aspect of NATO’s collaboration with Qaddafi

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Over the weekend news broke that Libya’s former intelligence services had links to the CIA and MI6. This news shouldn’t shock anyone who acknowledges that after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Libya agreed – through a process that included back-channel negotiations – to relinquish its nuclear weapons program. Reportedly, however, the relationship expanded after 2003, to include cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts.  In this arrangement, Libya shared information on terrorist groups and took-in rendered suspected terrorists. Again, news that shouldn’t shock anyone.

However, criticism against the U.S. and NATO now centers on two things: 1) How immoral it was to collaborate with Qaddafi. And 2) How that collaboration may affect our role in the future government of Libya.

To the first point. Saying it was reprehensible to work with Qaddafi presumes that other options were more preferable. In reality, had the U.S. forgone collaboration it would have lost a strategic asset in Northern Africa and been worse off. Essentially, intelligence played the hand it was dealt.

To the second point. Rebel forces, unless oblivious, most likely had already suspected U.S. and NATO involvement with Qaddafi before the discovery of these documents. At worst, this could deepen suspicion of Western influence, but that does not deny they will still need Western support to survive. Lastly, it would have been significantly more difficult for Western intelligence to grapple with the rebellion in Libya, had it not already established a foothold in the country through Qaddafi.  The reality did not present a choice between good and bad, but instead a chance to choose the less worse of two options.

Perhaps the most worrisome part of this story has been covered in the Christian Science Monitor. By relinquishing his nuclear weapons program, Qaddafi lost his most important security umbrella. This made it easy for NATO to turn on him and aid the rebels. Essentially, this has signaled to countries like Iran and North Korea that by giving up their nuclear weapons program they face greater risk of Western backed rebellion.

Written by gringolost

September 4, 2011 at 12:07 pm

America’s disappearing strategy

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Strategy is like magic. Both the magician and strategist use art and science to wow their audience by seemingly pulling off the implausible. It’s not the rabbit emerging from the hat that is magic, it’s the process making it happen that is magic. The same goes for strategy. So when President Obama makes “Disrupting, Dismantling, and Defeating Al-Qa’ida and its Violent Extremist Affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Around the World” a key component of this year’s National Security Strategy (NSS), he is missing the point. That is a goal, not a strategy.

Of course, it is intriguing that the U.S. would even feign interest in publishing its national security strategy for the entire world to see but that’s not the point. The point is no matter which document you read, whether the Quadrennial Defense Review, this year’s NSS, the NSPD (for G.W. Bush) or PPD (for Obama), there is hardly any coherent plan in any of these so-called “grand strategy” documents. All these documents get strategy wrong. They fail to recognize how strategy is more than just stating a goal; it is establishing preferences, prioritizing interests, and employing the available means in a coherent plan to achieve those interests.

Going back to the previous example, the NSS aims to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa’ida … through a comprehensive strategy that denies them safe haven, strengthens front-line partners, secures our homeland, pursues justice through durable legal approaches, and counters a bankrupt agenda of extremism and murder with an agenda of hope and opportunity.” These statements are hyperbole more than strategy. The U.S. should strengthen partners and secure the homeland anyway, regardless of any al Qa’ida threat.

A better strategy against al Qa’ida would recognize that the organization has morphed into an ideological program that can be adopted by self-starters who want to carry out homegrown terrorism. America’s strategy has to distinguish between what it wants to do and what it can do against these types of organizations. Fighting a global amorphous threat requires infinite reach and infinite resources. Without these, the U.S. must prioritize and seek defenses where it knows it can protect. Extending itself in distant theaters only exposes America to greater security risk.

In addition to violent extremism, there are two other areas where the NSS falls woefully short: Iran and North Korea. Admittedly, these challenges are hard. But if the U.S. wants Iran to “live up to its international responsibilities” it must recognize that Iran has different perceptions of these responsibilities. As well, the U.S. must recognize that Iran has sufficient leverage over American policy in the region that it can avoid certain amounts of coercion. The U.S. should make a sober assessment of itself to see exactly what it can coerce Iran to do. Trying to alter Iran’s behavior beyond America’s capability to do so is really just wasting time. The same goes for North Korea and the developing problems on that peninsula. The U.S. is severely handicapped in what it can make North Korea do. The U.S. must reassess its position in that region as well.

Lastly, the national security strategy should include only those things which are absolutely imperative. Needlessly adding peripheral interests complicates planning. Thus, while interests such as countering nuclear proliferation, combating terrorism, and securing cyberspace are all a must. It is less true that growing America’s space capabilities, opening foreign markets to trade, or cutting carbon emissions are essential to national security. To be sure, these are all valuable goals but they do nothing but add complexity to the already difficult task. Likening it to magic, the objective of strategy is to draw in the audience with one hand while the other performs the important functions which make the trick work. By overloading America’s national security strategy it can ruin the trick.

My return to blogging: Looming danger in Korea, debt burdens, and security strategy

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Life’s been hectic the past month or so. But after last week’s graduation from The Fletcher School (congrats fellow neo-alumni!), my schedule is starting to clear up. Now free from classes, I can concentrate on those other things that make me miserable, i.e. job searching and FINISHING MY THESIS. But in the meantime, why not do some learning through blogging.

I’ll start my return with a quick post about interesting news items and hopefully pick up a steady schedule of 1 or 2 posts a week. My focus, for those unfamiliar, is on geopolitical issues, American defense and national security, and odd international news (the kind that makes foreign policy more interesting than domestic policy).

So here we go…

News on Korea

The Cheonan Report has been out for more than a week now (text can be found here: ROK Cheonan report 5-20-10). In it overwhelming evidence reveals that North Korea sunk the ROK warship Cheonan with a torpedo. Since then concern has been that Kim Jong-il approved of the strike personally, while some speculate it was an act of insubordination. What could the analysis be if either of these scenarios are the case? If Kim approved of the attack is this a plea cloaked by a dagger? Or is Kim signaling back off or else? If the act was an insubordinate action by a rogue commander, does this mean Kim is losing control of his regime with power going to the military? Something not unlikely in a country about to be taken over by third generation 27-year old heir apparent. These are points up for discussion.

More related news: there is some confusion about the level of technological advancement in North Korea’s submarine fleet. And South Korea has lost track of four North Korean subs. Here’s some insight courtesy of the Cheonan Report – The North Korean military is in possession of a fleet of about 70 submarines, comprised of approximately 20 Romeo class submarines (1,800 tons), 40 Sango class submarines (300 tons) and 10 midget submarines including the Yeono class (130 tons).

Oddly related news: Zimbabwe’s reprobate president Robert Mugabe is sending an il-conceived gift (get the pun) of wild animals to North Korea, apparently as a token of friendship.

News on National Debt

It soars past $13 trillion, or 13000000000000.

Related:

News on Security Strategy

General McChrystal called Marjah a “bleeding ulcer.” Something you don’t want to hear about a campaign that is supposed to be the blueprint for the coalition’s plans in Kandahar. Meanwhile, Obama reveals his National Security Strategy in which he admits our “military is overstretched.”

So that’s most of the latest. There is, of course, an ongoing oil spill that everyone is well aware of. But BP is on the case with its poorly named “Top Kill” attempt to stop the ongoing oiling of the Gulf.

Cheonan's torpedo impact location

Nuclear stubborn Iran and North Korea

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If you could have a nuclear weapon, would you give it up?

North Korea doesn’t seem like it would.  On September 4th, the bi-polar Pyongyang declared it was in the “last phase” of nuclear enrichment.  Apparently, a North Korean spokesman even added that it was open to either “sanctions or dialogue” when talking about six-party talks.

Meanwhile, Iran is ignoring requests by the International Atomic Energy Association to “re-engage” the UN agency on questions regarding its nuclear program.  Citing a rule within the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran continues to enrich uranium despite many international objections.

Sec. Clinton on relations with North Korea

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After the release of the two American prisoners yesterday, Secretary Clinton said this about future relations with North Korea:

The future of our relationships with the North Koreans are really up to them. They have a choice; they can continue to follow a path that is filled with provocative actions which further isolates them from the international community, which resulted in the imposition of sanctions by the Security Council and the full cooperation of the international community, including and led by China, for the implementation of those sanctions under the resolution. Or they can decide to renew their discussions with the partners in the Six-Party Talks. We have always said there would be a chance to discuss bilateral matters with the North Koreans within that regional context and that is still the offer today.

Written by gringolost

August 5, 2009 at 10:24 am